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M
any occupations are subject to learning by doing: Effort at the
workplace early in the career of a worker results in higher pro-
ductivity later on.1 In such occupations, if effort at work is unob-
servable, a moral hazard problem arises as well. The combination of these
two characteristics of effort implies that employers need to provide incentives
for the employee to work hard, possibly in the form of pay-for-performance,2
while taking into account at the same time the optimal path of human capital
accumulation over the duration of the contract.
The recent crisis had a big impact on the labor market with high job-
destruction rates. If ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital accumulation is important,
the effect of these separations on welfare may come from several channels. A
directchannelisthroughthelossofhumancapitalpromptedbytheexogenous
separation, as well as the loss in welfare from the decrease in wealth because
of unemployment spells of workers. A less direct channel, but potentially
an important one, is the change in the cost of providing incentives when the
(exogenous to the incentive provision) separation rate increases. However,
we are far from being able to understand and measure the importance of this
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1 See Arrow (1962), Lucas (1988), and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) for a complete
discussion of this issue, as well as alternative speciﬁcations of learning by doing.
2 Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) report that, for a Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics sample of male household heads aged 18–65 working in private sector wage and salary jobs,
the incidence of pay-for-performance jobs was about 38 percent in the late 1970s and increased
to about 45 percent in the 1990s. They deﬁne pay-for-performance jobs as employment relation-
ships in which part of the worker’s total compensation includes a variable pay component (bonus,
commission, piece rate). Any worker who reports overtime pay is considered to be in a non-pay-
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cost, since little is known so far about the structure of incentive provision in
the presence of learning by doing.3 This article constitutes a modest ﬁrst step
in this direction: Abstracting from separations and in a partial equilibrium
setting, this article studies the time allocation of incentives and human capital
accumulation in the optimal contract. This simpliﬁed analysis should be a
helpfulbenchmarkinfuturestudiesofthefullyﬂedgedmodelwithseparations
and general equilibrium.
We modify the standard repeated moral hazard (RMH) framework from
Rogerson (1985a) to include learning by doing. In the standard framework, a
risk-neutral employer, the principal, designs a contract to provide incentives
for a risk-averse employee, the agent, to exert effort in running the technology
of the ﬁrm. Both the principal and the agent commit to a long-term contract.
The agent’s effort is private information and it affects the results of the ﬁrm
stochastically: The probability distribution over the results of the ﬁrm (the
agent’s “productivity”) in a given period is determined by the effort choice of
theagentinthatsameperiodonly. Weintroducethefollowingmodiﬁcationto
this standard framework: We specify learning by doing by assuming that the
probabilitydistributionovertheresultsoftheﬁrmineachperiodisdetermined
bythesumofpastundepreciatedefforts oftheagent, asopposedtohiscurrent
effort only. In other words, the agent’s productivity is determined by his
“accumulated human capital.” More human capital implies higher expected
output, although all possible output levels may realize under any level of
human capital. In this speciﬁcation, the agent determines his human capital
deterministically by choosing effort each period. Lower depreciation of past
effort is interpreted as “more persistence” of effort.
We present a model of two periods. The ﬁrst period represents the junior
years, when the worker has just been hired and has little experience. The
second period represents the mature worker years, when human capital has
been potentially accumulated and there are no more years ahead in which to
exploit the productivity of the worker. A contract contingent on the observed
performance of the agent is designed by the principal to implement the path
of human capital accumulation that maximizes the principal’s expected proﬁt
(expected output minus expected payments to the agent).
In our analysis, we ﬁnd the following two main implications of the pres-
enceoflearningbydoing. First,theprincipaldoesnotﬁnditoptimaltorequire
a high level of human capital in the last period of the contract, since there is
not much time left to exploit the productivity of the worker. Hence, the more
experienced workers are not the most productive ones, since they optimally
areaskedtolettheirhumancapitaldepreciate. Thisimpliesthatworkersexert
3 The only articles dealing with effort persistence in a repeated moral hazard problem are,
to our knowledge, Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005), Kwon (2006), and
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the most effort in their junior years, and the least in their pre-retirement years.
In a comparison with the standard RMH problem, we ﬁnd that the frontload-
ing of effort, as well as the low requirement at the end of the worker’s career,
differ markedly from the optimal path of effort in a context without learning
by doing. Second, and in spite of this difference in effort requirements over
the contract length, we ﬁnd that learning by doing does not imply a change
in the properties of consumption paths; hence, the properties of consumption
paths found by previous studies, such as Phelan (1994), remain true in this
context (see alsoAles and Maziero [2009]).
It is worth noting that in our analysis we assume perfect commitment to
the contract both from the employer and the employee, and we do not allow
for separations to be part of the contract. This means we need to abstract
from the usual career concerns that have been explored in the literature (see
Gibbons and Murphy [1992]). The implications of the hidden human capital
accumulation that we model here should be viewed as complementary to the
implications of career concerns.
As pointed out above, the problem studied here differs from the standard
RMH in that the contingent contract needs to take into account the persistent
effectsofeffortonproductivity. Onthetechnicalside, thishighlycomplicates




of effort today). Jarque (2010) deals with this difﬁculty and presents a class
of problems with persistence for which a simple solution can be found. The
article studies a general framework in which past effort choices affect current
output, as opposed to other forms of persistence that one may consider, such
as through output autocorrelation (see, for example, Kapiˇ cka [2008]). The
learning-by-doingproblemthatweareinterestedin,hence,constitutesaﬁtting
applicationoftheresultsinJarque(2010). WeadapttheassumptionsinJarque
(2010) to a ﬁnite horizon and we show how this speciﬁcation of learning by
doing greatly simpliﬁes the analysis of the optimal contract.
In Section 1 we introduce the common assumptions throughout the arti-
cle. Section 2 presents, as a benchmark, the case in which the principal can
directlyobservethelevelofeffortchosenbytheagenteveryperiod, andhence
can control his human capital at all times. For reference, we also discuss the
case in which the effort of the agent does not have a persistent effect in time.
The analytical properties of the problem are discussed in both cases. Then we
analyzethemaincaseofinterestofthisarticle, inwhicheffortisunobservable
andcontractsthatspecifypaymentscontingentontheobservableperformance
of the agent are needed to implement the desired sequence of human capital
accumulation. In Section 3, we discuss the case without persistence—a stan-
dard two-period repeated moral hazard problem. In Section 4 we discuss the342 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
technicaldifﬁcultiesofallowingforeffortpersistenceinproblemsofrepeated
moral hazard, and the solutions provided in the literature. Section 5 presents
the framework of hidden human capital accumulation, a particular case of
effort persistence. As the main result, we provide conditions under which
the problem with hidden human capital can be analyzed by studying a related
auxiliary problem that is formally a standard repeated moral hazard problem.
Hence, the discussion of the properties of the standard case in Section 3 be-
comes useful when deriving the properties of the case with persistence. The
numerical solution to an example is presented in Section 6, together with a
comparison to the standard RMH without learning by doing, and a discussion
of the main lessons about the effects of hidden human capital accumulation
on wage dynamics. Section 7 concludes.
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
TheresultsinthisarticleapplytocontractsofﬁnitelengthT;however,inorder
to keep the exposition and the notation as simple as possible, we discuss here
the case of a two-period contract, T = 2. We assume that both parties commit
to staying in the contract for the two periods. For tractability, we assume that
the principal has perfect control over the savings of the agent. They both
discount the future at a rate β. We assume that the principal is risk neutral and
the agent is risk averse, with additively separable utility that is linear in effort.
Assumption 1 Theagent’sutilityisgivenbyU (ct,e t) = u(ct)−vet, where
u is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave and ct and
et denote consumption and effort at time t, respectively.
There is a ﬁnite set of possible outcomes in each period, Y = {yL,y H}.
Histories of outcomes are assumed to be observable to both the principal
and the agent. We assume both consumption and effort lie in a compact set:





We model the hidden accumulation of human capital by assuming that
the effect of effort is “persistent” over time, in a learning-by-doing fashion.
That is, we depart from the standard RMH framework, which assumes that
the probability distribution over possible outcomes realizations at t depends
only on et. In our human capital accumulation framework, the probability
distribution at t depends on all past efforts up to time t. Assumption 2 states
this formally for the two-period problem.
Assumption 2 The agent affects the probability distribution over outcomes
according to the following function:
Pr(yt = yH|st) ≡ π (st),A. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 343
where
s1 = e1, (1)
s2 = ρs1 + e2, (2)
and π (s) is continuous, differentiable, concave, and ρ ∈ (0,1).
In the human capital accumulation language, we could equivalently write
the law of motion for human capital as
s1 = e1
s2 = (1 − δ)s1 + e2,
where δ = 1 − ρ would represent the depreciation rate. Then,
f (st) =
 
yH with probability π (st)
yL with probability 1 − π (st)
could be interpreted as the production function or technology of the ﬁrm.
In the rest of the article, we loosely refer toAssumption 2 as effort being
“persistent,” we refer to st as the accumulated human capital at time t, and we
refer to ρ as the persistence rate.
The strategy of the principal consists of a sequence of consumption trans-
fers to the agent contingent on the history of outcome realizations, c =  
ci,c ij
 
i,j=L,H, to which the principal commits when offering the contract
at time 0. The agent’s strategy is a sequence of period best-response effort
choices that maximize his expected utility from t on, given the past history
of output: e = {e1,e 2i}i=L,H. At the beginning of each period, the agent
chooses the level of current effort, et. Then output yt is realized according
to the distribution determined by all effort choices up to time t. Finally, the
corresponding amount of consumption is given to the agent.
Acontractisapairofcontingentsequencesc ande. Fortheanalysisinthe
restofthearticle,itwillbeusefultofollowGrossmanandHart(1983)inusing




as choice variables.4 To denote the
domain for this new choice variable, we need to introduce the following set
notation:














4 If the reader is knowledgeable about contract theory, he or she may notice that this is not
a simple change of notation. In fact, when computing the solution to numerical examples (see
Section 6), we will follow the two-step procedure proposed in Grossman and Hart (1983). This
procedure consists of splitting the expected proﬁt-maximization problem of the principal in two
steps: (1) cost minimization of implementing a given effort level (on a grid of efforts), and (2)
choosing the effort on the grid that implies the highest expected proﬁt for the principal. Using
utility as the choice variable, it is easy to show that under the assumptions of this article there
will exist a unique minimum in the cost minimization problem.344 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly





we assume that ui ∈ Ui and uij ∈ Uij.
In order to keep the expressions in the article as simple as possible, and
abusing notation slightly, we also introduce some notation shortcuts. We
denote ci = u−1 (ui) for all i. We also write Pr(yt = yH|st) as πH (st) and
Pr(yt = yL|st) as πL (st).























where st changes with et as detailed in (1). In the same way, we can write the









πi (s2i)uij − ve2i
⎤
⎦ − ve1. (3)
Within this environment we are now ready to set up the problem of ﬁnding
the optimal contract that will provide the right incentives for human capital
accumulation at the least expected cost. Before analyzing the hidden human
capital accumulation case, however, we go through a series of related and
simpler cases that will serve in clarifying the main case of interest.
2. OBSERVABLE EFFORT
The case of observable effort is often referred to in the literature as ﬁrst-best
(FB)sinceitrepresentsthemaximumjointutilityachievableinthecontractual
relationship between the principal and the agent. This is because, if effort is
observable, the principal can directly control the choice of effort of the agent
and, hence, there is no need for incentives. This implies that there is no
need to impose risk on the agent, which results in lower expected transfers
from the principal to the agent. Although we are interested in the case of
unobservable effort, it is useful to also analyze this simpler benchmark to
learnaboutthedifferencesbetweentheproblemwitheffortpersistence(human
capitalaccumulation)andthestandardRMHproblem(inwhichhumancapital
fully depreciates every period).










ui ∈ Ui,u ij ∈ Uij ∀i ∀i,j (CD)
w0 ≤ W0 (u,e). (PC)
ThesolutiontoproblemFBisacontractthatconsistsofapairofcontingent
sequences of utility and effort that maximize the expected proﬁt of the princi-
pal subject to the participation constraint (PC)—which assures that the agent
expects as much utility from accepting the contract than staying out—and the
domain constraints for consumption (CD) and effort (ED). Characterizing the
solution to this problem when considering all the possible combinations of
(ED) and (CD) binding constraints is very lengthy and tedious. In the inter-
est of space, we choose to discuss here only the case in which neither of the
constraints in (CD) or (ED) bind.
Whatarethepropertiesofconsumptionandeffortintheoptimalcontract?
We learn them from looking at the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem. Let










u   
cij
  = λ, for i,j = L,H
(e1) :
 
π  (s1) + βρπ  (s2i)
 




: π  (s2i)(yH − yL) = vλ, for i = L,H. (4)
We analyze in turn the case with and without persistence.
Full Depreciation
First we analyze the observable effort version of a standard two-period RMH
problem (see, for example, Rogerson [1985a]). This case is nested in the
common framework presented above, for a value of the persistence parameter
ρ = 0. In this case, effort does not have a persistent effect on the output
distribution, that is, there is no learning by doing. Hence, we can say that the
human capital of the agent fully depreciates every period.
Here and throughout the rest of the paper, we use stars to denote the
solutions to the problems. When necessary, we index the solutions by two
arguments: the ﬁrst one takes a value P if ρ>0 (persistence) and a value
NP if ρ = 0 (no persistence). The second one takes a value FB if we
are in the case of observable effort and a value SB if we are in the case of
5 Standard arguments for λ>0 hold in this setup with persistence. The basic intuition is
that V ∗ (c,e;w0) is strictly decreasing in w0.346 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
unobservable effort. Hence, here we denote the solution to problem FB when
ρ = 0a su∗ (NP,FB) and e∗ (NP,FB). Note that, whenever it does not
lead to confusion, we do not include these arguments to keep the notation
light.
Since the right-hand sides of all the ﬁrst-order conditions for utility are
equal to λ, we conclude that the level of utility, and hence consumption,
should be the same independent of the output realizations and the period:
u∗
i = u∗
ij = u∗ for all i,j. The ﬁrst-order conditions of effort, in turn, imply
that effort requirements are independent of output realizations and the period:
e∗
1 = e∗
2i = e∗ for all i. It is easy to see that, given these properties of
consumption and effort, the (PC) in problem FB simpliﬁes to
w0 = (1 + β)
 
u∗ − ve∗ 
.
Hence, we can solve for the level of utility in the solution to the FB problem:
u∗ ≡
w0 + v (1 + β)e∗
1 + β
. (5)
Let c∗ ≡ u−1 (u∗). Let π 
j (e2) denote the derivative of πj (e2). Noting that
π 
H (e) =− π 
L (e),wecancombinetheﬁrst-orderconditionsforconsumption
and effort to get






(yH − yL) = v ∀t. (6)
Thatis,theoptimaleffortlevelissuchthatthemarginalbeneﬁtfromincreased
effort (the marginal increase in expected output times the marginal utility of
output) equals the marginal utility cost of effort.
The following properties summarize our conclusions about the FB prob-
lem with nonpersistent effort:
1A. We have that c∗
1 = c∗
2 = c∗.
2A. We have e∗
1 = e∗
2 = e∗.
The main property of the optimal consumption sequence of the FB contract in
the standard RMH problem is that the contract insures the agent completely
against consumption ﬂuctuations whenever feasible. The intuition for this
result is straightforward: Since the agent has concave utility in consumption,
this is the cheapest way of providing the agent with his outside utility. The
mainpropertyoftheoptimaleffort sequenceoftheFBcontractinthestandard
RMHproblemisaconstanteffortrequirementovertime. Thetradeoffbetween
increasing the disutility suffered by the agent and increasing the expected
output is exactly the same in each period, and hence the solution is the same
each time.
It is worth noting that the solution in the observable-effort case coincides
with that of a repeated static problem (“spot” contract) in which neither the
agent nor the principal commit to the two-period contract, and the outsideA. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 347
Table 1 Parameters of the Numerical Example
υ Marginal effort disutility 5.00
β Discount factor 0.65
yH Output realization, high state 30.00
yL Output realization, low state 20.00
w0 Outside utility 6.55
utility of the agent is
w0
2 each period. Hence, commitment has no value in the
case of observable effort and no persistence.
An example
Throughout this article, we illustrate the properties of each particular case of
the environment presented by solving a particular numerical example. This
makes it easy to compare across the different cases presented. The common
parameters of the example are listed in Table 1.
We also assume u(c) = 2
√




as well as e= 0.01 and e = 0.99.
We now solve for c∗ and e∗. Since we are in the case of full depreciation
of human capital, we use ρ = 0 and the formulas derived above. For our
















Together with (5) this gives us the solutions listed in Table 2.
Observable Human CapitalAccumulation
We now turn to analyzing the case in which the effects of effort are persistent
in time, with ρ>0. That is, we analyze the optimal contract in the presence
of human capital accumulation, or learning by doing.
We established above that the main property of the optimal consumption
sequence of the FB contract in the standard RMH problem is that the contract
insures the agent completely against consumption ﬂuctuations. Here we will
learn that this property remains true in the case with effort persistence. The
mainpropertyoftheoptimaleffortsequenceoftheFBcontractinthestandard348 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
RMH problem is also a constant effort requirement over time. We will learn
thatwheneffortispersistentthispropertynolongerholds: Effortrequirements
will vary over time even in the observable effort benchmark.
Wenowproceedtoderivetheseresultsbyformallyanalyzingtheproblem
of the principal FB for the case of ρ>0. She chooses an optimal contract:
a pair of contingent sequences u∗(P,FB) and e∗(P,FB) that solve problem
FB, i.e., they maximize the expected proﬁt of the principal subject to (PC)
and the domain constraints (CD) and (ED). We initially discuss the case in
whichneitherthe(CD)northe(ED)constraintbind. However,thelower(ED)
constraint(thenon-negativityconstraintoneffort)maybind, withpersistence,
in not-so-trivial cases. Because of its relevance, the case of this constraint
binding will be discussed in turn.
We can derive the properties of the solution by analyzing the ﬁrst-order
conditions in (4) for the case of ρ>0. The ﬁrst thing to note is that, as in
the case without persistence, neither consumption nor effort are contingent
on output realizations. However, effort recommendations will depend on the











The optimal level of consumption will be c∗ ≡ u−1 (u∗). We can substitute
the ﬁrst-order condition for effort e2 into that for e1, as well as the expression
of λ from the consumption ﬁrst-order conditions, to get an expression for the
tradeoff determining the choice of e1:








(yH − yL) = v (1 − βρ). (8)
Comparing this to the tradeoff determining the choice of e2,








(yH − yL) = v, (9)
welearnthatthemarginalcostofincreasingeffortintheﬁrstperiodisdifferent
(smaller)thanthatinthesecondperiod. Theoptimalchoicetakesintoaccount
that any effort e1 exerted in the ﬁrst period persists into the second one, i.e.,
it “saves” the agent the equivalent of the discounted disutility of effort of
exerting ρe1 in the second period. This difference in the effective cost of
effort that appears because of persistence implies that the principal sets the
effort requirements in a way that implies a higher probability of observing yH
in the ﬁrst period than in the second. We can see exactly how this difference















. (10)A. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 349
This implies s1 >s 2 since 1 − βρ is always between 0 and 1. From the








which implies a higher effort in the ﬁrst period than in the second, e∗
1 >e ∗
2.
The following properties summarize our conclusions about the case with
persistence and observable effort:
1B. We have that c∗
1 = c∗
2 = c∗.
2B. We have that e∗
1 >e ∗
2.
That is, whenever c∗ is feasible in both states, the principal provides complete
consumption smoothing, both across states and across time. As for effort
requirements, the principal decreases the requirement from the ﬁrst to the
second period. We repeat the intuition for this result: In the ﬁrst period,
the effort disutility incurred by the agent is a sort of “investment,” since it
improves the conditional distribution not only in the current period but also
in the following one. At t = 2, however, there is no period to follow, so the
marginal beneﬁts of effort are not as high, while the marginal cost is the same
as in the ﬁrst period.6
An example
We now solve for the optimal contract with persistence and observable effort.
For this case with accumulation of human capital, we use ρ = 0.2 and
the formulas derived above. We list the solution in Table 2. Note that the
level of s∗
2(P,FB) in this case is 0.16, smaller than that of the second-
period effort in the no-persistence case of the previous section, which was
e∗
2(NP,FB) = 0.17. Comparing the equations that determine each ([6]
for e∗
2(NP,FB) and [9] for s∗
2(P,FB)), we can see that c∗(P,FB) <













. Given the concavity of π (·), it fol-
lows that s∗
2( P,FB )<e ∗
2(NP,FB).
The Nonnegativity Constraint on Effort
In light of this solution we can discuss the case of the lower constraint in (ED)
binding. As an introduction to why this case is of particular relevance to the
6 In a T>2 framework with s0 = 0, we would have that e1 ≥ et for t<T , that et = e2
for t = 2,...,T − 1, and eT ≤ e2. Again, the intuition is that in all t<T , effort improves
the conditional distribution not only in the current period, but also in the periods that follow. At
t = 1, since s0 = 0, effort is higher than in any other period.350 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly








NP 5.82 5.82 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
P 4.95 4.95 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.16
problem with persistence, it is useful to consider the effect of changes in the
persistence parameter, ρ, on the effort solution just presented. For a value of
persistence ρ = 0, effort equals accumulated effort trivially, and its level is
constant across periods. On the other hand, if we instead substitute a value of
persistence ρ = 1, (1 − βρ) takes its minimum value in (10) and the solution
implies the maximum difference between the level of s1 and s2, with s1 much
higher than s2. However, carefully inspecting (11), we can already see that
such high level of persistence cannot be compatible with an interior solution
for effort in period 2: The principal would choose e∗
2 = 0. Since s∗
1 >s ∗
2 for
all values of ρ>0, effort e∗
2 may not be interior for other high enough values
of ρ. In other words, persistence implies that, in many interesting cases, the
lower domain constraint on effort (ED) cannot be safely ignored.
Constraint (ED) is represented by the following set of inequalities:
s2i ≤ ρs1 + e + e, (12)
and
s2i ≥ ρs1 + e. (13)
Constraint (12) may be binding for some parametrizations. However, we
choose not to discuss this case explicitly here because it is easy to impose ex
ante conditions on the parameters that preclude it from binding; for example,
for the speciﬁcation of the probability in (7), it is easy to see that s ≥ e is
never chosen in the optimal contract. The lower bound on s represented in
(13), however, is endogenous, and equation (13) cannot be checked without
havingthesolutions∗
1 inhand. Fortunately,inthecaseofobservableeffortthat
we are analyzing here, we are able to include constraint (13) explicitly in the
maximizationproblemFB.Thisallowsustostudyhowthesolutionproperties
differ from those in 1B and 2B discussed above when this constraint binds.
Let γ i ≥ 0 be the multiplier associated with constraint (13) in the version
of problem FB for the case ρ>0. We have that the ﬁrst-order condition for
e2i is modiﬁed as follows:
(e2i) : π  (s2i)(yH − yL) = vλ− γ i, for i = L,H. (14)
Note that, again, the choice for effort in the second period is not contingent on
the ﬁrst-period outcome, so we have γ L = γ H = γ. Then we can substituteA. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 351
(14)intotheunmodiﬁedﬁrst-orderconditionforﬁrst-periodeffort,(e1),toget
a general version of equation (8) that allows for the lower domain constraint
of effort to be binding:
π  (s1)(yH − yL) = vλ(1 − βρ) + βργ. (15)
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we know that whenever γ>0w eh a v e
e∗




In some special cases, we can check ex ante whether γ = 0 is a feasible
solution to the FB problem, and hence we can restrict ourselves to the simpler



























2 from (16), whenever
(1 − βρ)
2 ≥ ρ. (17)
A closer inspection of condition (17) shows that, for β ≤ 0.5, it is always
satisﬁed. For higher β values, however, the condition is satisﬁed only for low
enough ρ values, i.e., when effort is not “too persistent.” In our example, for
β = 0.65, we need to check whether (17) is satisﬁed: The left-hand side is
equal to 0.76, which is clearly greater than the right-hand side, 0.2.
To summarize the ﬁndings of our analysis, we have shown that for the
numerical example presented here, we can provide ex ante conditions (a func-
tional form for the probability as in equations [7] and [17]) on the parameters
of the problem that assure us that the domain constraints on (ED) do not bind.
Under such restrictions, the characteristics of the solution to the ﬁrst-best
problem 1B and 2B presented earlier in this section are valid.
In relation to those characteristics, it is worth pointing out that the proper-
ties of effort requirements depend strongly on our assumption that the utility
of the agent is linear in effort. Linearity implies that there is no tradeoff be-
tween the efﬁcient accumulation path of human capital and smoothing effort
disutilityovertime. Inotherwords, thesmoothingofeffortrequirementsover
the duration of the contract does not increase the overall utility of the agent,
as is the case with consumption smoothing; hence, the principal only takes352 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
into account the effects that different accumulation paths have on the utility
of the agent and his own proﬁt through the changes in expected output over
time. In the numerical example in Section 6, we will revisit the solution to the
observable-effort case discussed here, and we will see the direct consequence
of this: It is optimal to ask the agent to exert effort earlier rather than later
in the contract, since effort that is done early improves the distribution over
future output, holding constant the level of future effort.
3. UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT WITH FULL DEPRECIATION
When effort is not directly observable, the principal must rely on observed
output realizations, which are imperfect signals about the effort level of the
agent, in order to implement the desired sequence of human capital. Contrary
to the case of observable effort, here consumption in a given period will need
tovarywiththeoutputrealizationinordertoprovideincentivesfortheworker
to choose the recommended level of effort.










ui ∈ Ui,u ij ∈ Uij ∀i ∀i,j (CD)
U ≤ W0 (u,e) (PC)
W0 (u,e) ≥ W0 (u,  e) ∀  e  = e. (IC)
The incentive constraint (IC) ensures that the expected utility that the agent
gets from following the principal’s recommendation is at least as large as that
of any other effort sequence.
In order to illustrate clearly the differences that derive from the presence
of effort persistence in this two-period problem, we analyze ﬁrst the version
without persistence (ρ = 0), that is, with full depreciation of human capital
every period, or no learning by doing. Moreover, because the main result that
we will derive when we study the case with ρ>0 is that, in some cases, the
propertiesforconsumptionintheoptimalcontractwillbethesameasthoseof
theoptimalcontractinaframeworkwithoutpersistence, itisusefultoanalyze
in detail the properties of the solution with observable effort.
Without persistence, the structure of the incentive constraints simpliﬁes
considerably. This inﬂuences the solution, but also the ways in which the
problemcanbestudied. Inparticular,thestandardRMHproblemhasasimple
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provide an illustration of this difference. Then, we discuss the difﬁculties
of introducing persistence, along with some potential solutions, in Section
4. In Section 5 we discuss our example with human capital accumulation, a
particularly simple case with effort persistence for which a solution can easily
be found.
A Simpliﬁed Incentive Compatibility Constraint
Inthecasewithoutpersistencethestructureoftheincentiveconstraintssimpli-
ﬁes considerably. In particular, the expected utility of the agent in the second




πj (s2i)uij − ve2i, for i = L,H, (18)
as the expected utilities for the second period, contingent on the ﬁrst-period
realization. This expression for the continuation utility simpliﬁes, when ρ =
0, to
W 
1i (u,e 2i) ≡
 
j=L,H
πj (e2i)uij − ve2i, for i = L,H. (19)
(Notethat,todistinguishthenotationforcontinuationutilitiesherefromthose
of the general case that allows for persistence in (18), we denote them here
with a prime and we make explicit the independence of e1.)
Whatisthesimpliﬁcationoftheincentiveconstraintsthatfollowsfromthis
independence? As it turns out, all the sequences that have the same choice of
effort in the second period, regardless of the ﬁrst-period effort choice, provide
the agent with the same expected utility in the second period, conditional
on the ﬁrst-period output realization being the same. In other words, the
deviations of the agent in the second period can be evaluated independently of
the ﬁrst-period effort choice, and also independently at each node following
the ﬁrst-period output realization. As a consequence, the number of relevant
incentive constraints for the agent is drastically decreased.
Toseethisformally,denotebyw1i ≡ W 
1i (u,e 2i)thecontinuationutilities
evaluated at the effort requirement of the principal. Then all the incentive
constraints that involve deviations only in the second period, or that have the
same effort choice for the ﬁrst period, simplify to
w1i ≥ W 
1i (u,  e2i) ∀  e2i  = e2i for i = L,H. (20)
We refer to equation (20) as the “second-period incentive constraints.”7
7 For a more concrete illustration, consider the case with discrete effort and E = [eL,eH].
Then the initial number of IC constraints would be seven, and they would simplify to three: one
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Now note that the independence of W 
1i (u,  e2i) on e1 also implies the
following: Imposing the second-period incentive constraints in (20) serves to
assure that all potential deviations (  e1,  e2L,  e2H) that consider effort choices
in the second period that are not e2H and e2L are dominated by a strategy
(  e1,e 2L,e 2H) that considers the same deviation in period 1 and none in the
second period. Formally, what we are saying is that
 
i=L,H
πi (  e1)[ui + βw1i] − v  e1 ≥
 
i=L,H
πi (  e1)
 
ui + βW 
1i (u,  e2i)
 
− v  e1
trivially simpliﬁes to the second-period incentive constraint in (20). This is
useful because it means that when we are evaluating deviations in the ﬁrst
period we forget about potential deviations in the second period as well, and
simply substitute w1i into the second period utility:
 
i=L,H
πi (e1)[ui + βw1i] − ve1 ≥
 
i=L,H
πi (  e1)[ui + βw1i] − v  e1. (21)
We refer to these constraints as the “ﬁrst-period incentive constraints.”
The independence of second-period expected utility on ﬁrst-period effort
choice not only decreases the number of IC constraints that we need to con-
sider, but also allows the problem of the principal to be analyzed period by
period. This is precisely because all future period payoffs can be summarized
throughthepromisedutilityw1i withoutspecifyingtheparticularconsumption
transfers or effort recommendations that will deliver w1i in the future. From
a practical point of view, it is important to note that the range of values that
w1i can take is independent of the agent’s action in the ﬁrst period, and hence
can be calculated by simply using the domain restrictions for consumption
and second-period effort, together with the second-period IC in (20). This is
a very useful feature when we want to compute the solution for a particular
numerical example, as we will do in Section 6.
To summarize, the simpliﬁcations we just discussed are the reason why
the recursive formulation ﬁrst introduced by Spear and Srivastava (1987) is
possible. In a ﬁnite two-period problem like the one presented here, this also
meansthatwecansolvetheproblembackwardandcharacterizetheproperties
of the solution. We proceed to do that now.
A Backward Induction Solution to the
Optimal Contract
As a ﬁrst step, we use the fact that incentives in the second period are inde-
pendent of choices and utilities in the ﬁrst period. This allows us to split the
problem of the agent in the IC into two problems: a ﬁrst-period problem and
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πi (e1)(ui + βw1i) − ve1,
where wi is the expected utility for the second period in equilibrium.
If we want to characterize the optimal contract, ﬁrst we need to transform
these maximization problems into an equality constraint that we can include
intheproblemoftheprincipal. Followingthespiritoftheﬁrst-orderapproach
(seeRogerson[1985b]),weestablishconcavityofthemaximizationproblems
in PIC1 and PIC2. Then we can substitute them by their ﬁrst-order conditions,
which are necessary and sufﬁcient for a maximum. In our two-outcome ex-
ample, this concavity is fairly straightforward to guarantee. It is easy to see
that, for any positive ﬁrst-period effort recommendation to satisfy the origi-
nal ﬁrst-period IC in (21), we need uH + βwH >u L + βwL. Also, for any
second-period positive effort recommendation to satisfy the second-period IC
in (20), we need uiH >u iL. Since we have assumed that πH (·) is a con-
cave function of effort, concavity of the expected utility of the agent in effort





i (e1)(ui + βwi) − v = 0, (22)





j (e2i)uij − v = 0. (23)
Using these in place of the original IC allows us to derive some properties for
the optimal contract.
As a second step in characterizing the optimal contract, we appeal to the
same logic that we spelled out to show the independence of second-period
utility of the agent on his ﬁrst-period actions, to argue that the same indepen-
dence holds for the expected proﬁt of the principal. The objective function in














Hence, to solve problem SB subject to (PC) and (22) and (23)—assuming the
domain constraints are not binding—we can simply split the problem across
8 For a higher number of output levels, the conditions on the probability function that would
assure concavity have not been determined (see Rogerson [1985b] and Jewitt [1988] for a discussion
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the two periods and solve it backward using subgame perfection. First, we








πj (e2i)uij − ve2i.
Letμi andλi bethemultipliersoftheﬁrstandsecondconstraints,respectively.






u   
cij




,j = L,H. (24)
This condition will be familiar to the reader acquainted with basic contract
theory: Since the second-period problem is, in fact, a static moral hazard, we
ﬁnd that this ﬁrst-order condition links consumption to likelihood ratios in
the same way as in a static contract (see Prescott [1999] for a review of this
textbook case). The likelihood ratios capture the informational value of each
possible output realization. The same static intuition prevails in the case for













j (e2i)uij = 0. (25)
It is easier to see the intuition when we substitute π 
L (e) =− π 
H (e) in the
expression above and get
(e2i) : π 
H (e2i)[yH − yL − (ciH − ciL)] + μiπ  
H (e2i)(uiH − uiL) = 0.
Weseethattheprincipalequatesthemarginalincreaseintheexpectednetproﬁt
that comes from a higher probability of yH with the change in the marginal
increase in expected compensation associated with it, given that uiH >u iL.
Note, however, that the solution for the second period is contingent on
the value of w1i (which plays the role of the period outside utility in a static
problem). With the solution to the second-period problem in hand, we can
calculate the value to the principal of promising a level of utility of w1i to the
agent for the second period. Hence, we know the value of V1i (w1i) and we
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Let μ and λ be the multipliers of the ﬁrst and second constraints, respectively.








,i = L,H. (26)
Thesemirrortheconditionsin(24)forthesecondperiod: Therankingofcon-
sumption is again determined by the likelihood ratios, although the dispersion
is potentially different and depends on the multiplier of the ﬁrst-period incen-
tive constraint, μ. The values of μ and μi, as well as λ and λi, are difﬁcult to
get for generic utility functions. (To see this, note that the ﬁrst-order condi-
tionsgiveusinformationaboutu  (c), whiletheconstraintsoftheproblemsP1
and P2i are written in terms of u(c); this makes for a highly nonlinear system
of equations that seldom has an explicit solution.) This is why computing nu-
merically the solution to particular problems is a popular strategy in dynamic
contract theory.9
Recall that in this ﬁrst period the principal has an extra choice variable
with respect to problem P2i: the contingent levels of expected utility of the
agent in the second period, w1i. The importance of the value of w1i relative
to that of ui in the optimal contract is at the heart of dynamic incentives. We
can explore the optimal tradeoff between the two variables by looking at the
ﬁrst-order condition for the continuation utility:
(w1i) : V  




= 0,i = L,H. (27)
To interpret this condition we need to ﬁgure out the derivative of the value
function of the principal, V  
1i (w1i). We do this by using the envelope theorem
and the second-period problem P2i that determines V (w1i):
V  
1i (w1i) =− λi.
Substituting this derivative into (27) we get





Note that this, combined with (26), implies λi = 1
u (ci). What does the λi
multiplier represent in the second period? It is the shadow value of relaxing
the “promise keeping” constraint of the principal in the second period. The
principalhascommittedtodeliveralevelofexpectedutilityofw1i. Howcostly
this is for him depends on the necessary spread of utilities in order to satisfy
incentives in the second period. This can be seen formally by multiplying





9 For details on these computations see, for example, Phelan and Townsend (1991) or
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to the principal of increasing consumption, −1, and the marginal increase
in utility of spending this extra unit of consumption, u  (c). Now we take
this condition further: Since we had established that λi = 1
u (ci), we get the













This is the so called “Rogerson condition,” ﬁrst derived in Rogerson (1985a).
It summarizes how the optimal dynamic contract with commitment allocates
incentives over time and histories. We now discuss its implications for the
choices of effort and consumption.
Effort and Consumption Choices Over Time
To illustrate the implications of the Rogerson condition, consider, for the
sake of comparison, a slightly different model to the one presented here:
Everythingelseequal, assumenocommitmenttolong-termcontractsforboth
the principal and the agent. This is often referred to as “spot contracting.” For
the purpose of our comparison, set the per period outside utility for the agent
to
w0
2 in both periods. It is easy to see that the solution to this problem without
commitment is the repetition of the one-period optimal contract. This implies
that the second-period consumptions would be independent of the ﬁrst-period
realizations, and hence identical to those in the ﬁrst: cH = cLH = cHH,a s
well as cL = cHL = cLL. It is immediate that this solution to the spot contract
violates (28).
How is the contract with commitment different than the repetition of the
static contract? The main difference is that with commitment the contract
exhibits memory, i.e., the level of consumption in the second period, contin-
gent on a second-period realization, is different depending on the ﬁrst-period
realization. Whyisitoptimalforthecontractwithcommitmenttobedifferent
than the repetition of the static contract? Because it allows incentives to be
providedinamoreefﬁcientway. Thereasonbecomesclearifweconsiderhow
the principal can improve on the repetition of the static contract once he has
commitment to a two-period contract. If the agent gets a yH realization in the
ﬁrst period, his overall expected utility increases if he trades off some of the
consumption that the static contract assigns him in the ﬁrst period with some
expected consumption in the second. Because cH was high to start with, the
decrease in his ﬁrst-period utility from postponing some consumption trans-
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haspositiveprobabilityoffacinglowconsumptionwheneveryL realizes. This
means the principal can, with this deviation from the spot contract solution,
keepsomeoftheconsumptionforhimselfwhileleavingconstanttheexpected
utility following the high realization node in the ﬁrst period, i.e., uH + βwH.
In the same way, if the agent gets a yL realization in the ﬁrst period, he is
better off by trading some expected utility in the second period for some con-
sumption in the ﬁrst, and this again saves resources for the principal. Hence,
in the optimal contract, we have that w1H >w 1L. It is worth noting that these
optimaltradeoffsresultinaviolationoftheEulerequationoftheagent, which
is incompatible with (28).10
The last ﬁrst-order condition of problem P1 left for analyzing is that of









i (e1)(ui + βw1i) = 0.
This condition captures the same tradeoff discussed after deriving the second-
period effort ﬁrst-order conditions in (25). Of course, the values of the vari-
ables and multipliers will typically be different than in the second period,
implying a different solution across periods. To gain some important in-
sight in the properties of effort requirements over time, it is again useful to
compare the effort solution here to that of the spot contract without commit-
ment. It is easy to see that the repetition of the static contract would imply
e1 = e2H = e2L.11 Here, instead, this is not the case. If we recall that the
optimalcontractimpliesw1H >w 1L,asimpleinspectionofthesecond-period
problem P2 tells us that, for the principal, effort incentives are more expensive
following a yH realization than a yL realization. The continuation utility w1i
playstheroleoftheoutsideutilityinastaticcontract. Itisimmediatefromthe
risk aversion of the agent that, for the same spread of utility that would satisfy
the IC in (23), a higher level of outside utility translates into more consump-
tion. Hence, the principal will optimally choose e2H <e 2L. Moreover, in the
second period the principal cannot provide incentives for effort as efﬁciently
as in the ﬁrst period, since the intertemporal tradeoff of consumption that we
described above is not available (there are no future periods after t = 2). This
will typically imply a lower effort requirement in the second period than in
theﬁrst. Weconcludethat, incontrastwiththeﬁrst-bestpropertysummarized
in 2A, effort requirements will ﬂuctuate over time and across histories in the
unobservable effort case in order to provide incentives more efﬁciently.
ThesolutiontothisversionofournumericalexampleispresentedinTable
3 and Figures 1 and 2. We defer the discussion of this solution example until
10 This follows from Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of 1/u  (c). For details, see
Rogerson (1985a).
11 Simply set w1H = w1L and note that π 
H (e1) =− π 
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Section 6, where we compare the solution to the unobserved effort case both
with full depreciation and without.
4. DEALING WITH PERSISTENCE
The simpliﬁcations outlined in the previous section, when effort is not persis-
tent, do not hold for the general case of ρ>0. Before we go on to analyze a
particular case of human capital accumulation in Section 5 and illustrate the
differences, we discuss here the main particularities that persistence of effort
introduces in the analysis of the optimal contract.
Twomaindifferenceswithrespecttothestandardframeworkappearwhen
effort is persistent. First, it is no longer the case that a given choice for
effort in the second period provides the agent with the same expected utility
w1i regardless of his ﬁrst-period effort choice e1. It follows that the number
of relevant incentive constraints is much higher in the problem with persis-
tence. Second, the problem of the principal cannot, in general, be written
in the usual recursive form in which the promised utility w1i summarizes all
relevant information about past periods. The relevant summary variable is
the original W1i (u,e), which depends on both the ﬁrst- and the second-period
effortchoices. ThedependenceofW1i (u,e)one1 complicatesthecalculation
of its possible values. In particular, this state variable is not a number (like
w1i was) but a function: The principal needs to take into account all possible
choicesfore1,includingthoseofftheequilibriumpath. Finally,theconditions
for concavity of the agent’s problem in the IC are difﬁcult to establish, even
in the two-outcome case presented here.
These issues have so far been addressed in the literature with two main
strategies. The ﬁrst strategy limits the effort choices to a two-point set, and
includes explicitly in the problem of the principal the complete list of relevant
incentive constraints for all possible combinations of effort choices. The
second strategy allows for a continuum of effort choices, but puts restrictions
on the functional form of π (e1,e 2) in order to simplify the set of constraints.
These approaches are now discussed in some detail.
A Hands-OnAnalysis of the Joint Deviations Problem
Within the ﬁrst approach, the main contribution is Fernandes and Phelan
(2000). They provide a tractable setup in which an augmented recursive for-
mulation of the problem of the principal is possible. Intuitively, this formula-
tion has an increased number of state variables with respect to the recursive
formulation of the moral hazard problem without persistence ﬁrst presented
in Spear and Srivastava (1987). The simpliﬁed framework that allows for the
recursive formulation limits the effort choices and the output realizations to
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lasts only for one period; that is, effort at time t affects only the probability
distribution over outcomes at time t and t + 1. The recursive formulation of
the problem of the principal has three state variables, one of which is the stan-
dard promised utility on Spear and Srivastava’s formulation. The two extra
states allow the principal to keep track of the marginal disutility of effort for
the agent across periods, as well as the set of utilities achievable by the agent
off the equilibrium path.
Still within the ﬁrst approach, Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005) limit the
effort choices and the output values to two and analyze a two-period prob-
lem. They assume that high effort is optimal every period. They are able
to provide analytical conditions on the conditional probability function under
which the implications of persistence are drastically different than those of no
persistence: When the ﬁrst-period effort affects the second-period probabil-
ity in a sufﬁciently stronger way than the second-period effort, the optimal
contract exhibits perfect insurance in the initial period. Using a recursive for-
mulation in the spirit of Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Mukoyama and S ¸ahin
also analyze a three-period problem numerically.
Kwon (2006) uses a very similar framework with discrete effort choices
(0 or 1), also assuming that high effort is implemented every period. He
imposes concavity of π (·) on the sum of past effort choices, so past effort is
more effective than current effort. These assumptions allow him to analyze a
T>2 period problem that shares the same perfect insurance characteristic as
in Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005).
A Particularly Simple Case of Persistence
The second approach, presented in Jarque (2010), allows for a continuum of
effort choices but assumes that the conditional probability depends on past ef-
fort choices only through the sum of undepreciated effort in the same manner
as stated inAssumption 2. Note that, even for a concave probability function
π (s),Assumption 2 implies that past effort is less effective than current effort
in contrast to what was assumed in Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005) or Kwon
(2006). The article shows that, for a subset of problems with this particular
form of persistence, the computation of the optimal contract simpliﬁes con-
siderably. For these problems, an auxiliary standard repeated moral hazard
problem without persistence can be used to recover the solution to the opti-
mal contract. The linearity in effort of both variable s (which determines the
probabilitydistribution)andtheutilityoftheagentdramaticallysimpliﬁesthe
structure of the joint deviations across periods; in practice, we can think of s
as the choice variable, and the structure of the resulting transformed problem
is (under some conditions) equivalent to that of a standard repeated moral
hazard.362 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In the next section, a ﬁnite version of the model in Jarque (2010) is
presentedandthisresultisexplainedindetail. Theﬁniteversionallowsforthe
numerical computation of the optimal contract in an example in
which the stochastic structure is interpreted as unobservable human capital
accumulation.
5. HIDDEN HUMAN CAPITALACCUMULATION
The problem of the principal is again as in problem SB, but now we consider
the case ρ>0. We argued in Section 4 that this case is more complicated
because of the dependence of second-period utility and optimal actions of the
agent on ﬁrst-period choices. In order to go around some of these difﬁculties,
hereweadapttoourtwo-periodﬁniteexamplethestrategypresentedinJarque
(2010) for solving problems with persistence. Following this work we will
showthat,underourassumptions,thestructureoftheproblemsimpliﬁestothat
of the standard repeated moral hazard presented above, provided the domain
constraintsin(ED)donotbind. Thisisanimportantqualiﬁcationsince, aswe
learned when analyzing the case of observable human capital accumulation in
Section 2, in the presence of persistence the effort domain constraints in (ED)
willsometimesbind,especiallyforhighvaluesofthepersistenceparameterρ.
Todealwiththisissue,wefollowtheapproachinJarque(2010): First,weﬁnd
a candidate solution assuming that the constraint in (ED) does not bind. Then
we need to check numerically that this constraint is indeed satisﬁed to be sure
that we have found a true solution. Unfortunately, a general analysis of the
optimization problem of the principal including the inequality constraints for
effort (again, as in Section 2) is more difﬁcult with unobserved effort. Hence,
ﬁnding the properties of the general case when constraint (ED) binds remains
a question for future research.
Rewriting the Problem
Jarque (2010) shows that, whenever the effort domain constraint (ED) is not
binding, we can ﬁnd the solution to the problem with persistence using a
related RMH problem without persistence as an auxiliary problem. The key
observationforthatresultisthatwecanwritetheexpectedutilityoftheagent,
W0 (u,e), as a function of the s variable only. This is convenient because
s is the variable that effectively determines the probability distribution over
outcomes each period; different combinations of effort choices that give rise
to the same s are equivalent both for the principal and for the agent. Hence,
once we rewrite the problem with s as the choice variable, there is no need to
consider joint deviations across periods, the recursive structure is recovered,
and we can solve for the optimal contract as we do with a standard repeated
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Let   W0 (u,s) = W0 (u,e) for all the pairs of s and e sequences such that s
resultsfromeffortchoicesine accordingtothelawofaccumulationofhuman
capital in (1). Writing the effort in the second period as
e2i = s2i − ρs1,
we have
  W0 (u,s) =
 
i=L,H









πj (s2i)uij − v (s2i − ρs1)
⎤
⎦.
Note that we have explicitly written the utility accrued in the ﬁrst period in
the ﬁrst row of this expression, and that of the second period in the second
row. With utility spelled out this way it is easy to see that, although s1 is all
accumulated in the ﬁrst period, it appears both in the ﬁrst- and second-period
utility. Also, since s1 is not contingent on any realization, it appears in the
second period both after observing a ﬁrst-period yH and a ﬁrst-period yL.
Hence, we can group the s1 terms of the second period together with those of
the ﬁrst, to get an expression of the form
  W0 (u,s) =
 
i=L,H









πj (s2i)uij − vs2i
⎤
⎦. (29)
This allows us to interpret s as the variable being chosen by the agent. In the
ﬁrst period, we can interpret v (1 − βρ) as the “marginal disutility of exerting
s1.” In the second period, the “marginal disutility of exerting s2” is instead v.
This rearrangement of terms and thinking about s as the choice variable
is a useful trick. Note that in the second row the expression inside the square
brackets is independent of s1. Interpreting s2i as the choice variable, we can
see that we can do here as we did in the case of no persistence and write





πj (s2i)uij − vs2i
 
=   W 
1i (u,s 2i).
Hence, we obtain expressions that parallel those of the standard RMH formu-
lation in (19). The expression in (29) can then simply be rewritten as





ui + β   W 
1i (u,s 2i)
 
− v (1 − βρ)s1.
Note also that the structure of the incentive constraints simpliﬁes as it did in




πj (s2i)uij −vs2i −ρv  s1 ≥
 
j=L,H
πj (  s2i)uij −v  s2i −vρ  s1, ∀  s1,  s2i.
Again, all these changes of notation are simply aimed at pointing to the fol-
lowing fact: The problem in which effort is persistent has a similar structure
to that of a standard RMH problem in which s is interpreted as effort that is
not persistent, but has marginal disutility of v (1 − βρ) at t = 1 and of v at
t = 2. To make this explicit, using the intertemporal regrouping of s1, the





w0 ≤   W0 (u,s)
  W0 (u,s) ≥   W0 (u,  s) ∀  s  = s
ui ∈ Ui ∀i
s1 ∈ S1







ρs1 + e,ρs 1 + e + e
 
. This rewriting leads to the
following observation: If problem SB’ were in fact formally equivalent to a
standardRMHproblem(withthemodiﬁedstructureofthemarginaldisutility),
thiswouldhelpusenormouslytoﬁndandcharacterizethesolutiontoSB,since
we would know how to solve it (or at least compute it numerically). However,
a close inspection of SB’points to a small but potentially important difference
with a standard RMH problem: In problem SB’, the domain S2 depends on
the choice of s1, while in a standard RMH problem this domain would be
exogenously given.
Using a Related RMH Problem without Persistence
as anAuxiliary Problem
Following Jarque (2010), we now show that, in some instances, we can work
around the difﬁculty that an endogenous domain S2 poses by using a related
auxiliary problem for our purposes instead of SB’. Consider a problem SBaux
that is equal to SB’ except for the domain S2, which is substituted by an




. Note that   S2 is exogenous so, interpreting s
as effort, problem SBaux is a standard RMH. We will now argue that, under
some conditions, the solution to SB’coincides with the solution to SBaux, and
hence we can easily obtain a solution to our problem with persistence.
The solution to problems SB’ and SBaux coincides when two conditions
are satisﬁed: (i) W0 (·) is concave in s, and (ii) the resulting optimal choices
for effort are interior. This is a set of sufﬁcient conditions because if theA. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 365
expected utility of the agent is concave in his choice of s, then the relevant
effort deviations are those close to the optimal (interior) s, and not those at the
limits of the domain. This implies that using an auxiliary domain that does
not exactly overlap with the true domain is not changing the solution to the
problem, aslongasthistruesolutioniscontainedintheauxiliarydomain. Are
each of these conditions satisﬁed in our framework?
(i) Concavity of W0 (·) in s. In our particular example, it is easy to argue
that the problem of the agent is concave in st for all t. In fact, the argument
is the same that we used earlier to argue that problems PIC1 and PIC2 were
concave: There are only two outcomes, the probability of observing yH is
concave in st, and current and future utility assigned to yH is always higher
than current and future utility assigned to yL.
(ii) Effort is interior. This is not satisﬁed trivially. Constraint (ED)
implies that two restrictions need to be checked to establish that the true
solution is contained in the proposed auxiliary domain:
s2i <ρ s 1 + e + e, i = L,H, (30)
s2i >ρ s 1 + e,i = L,H. (31)
Under the probability speciﬁcation in (7), equation (30) is always satisﬁed.
Otherspeciﬁcationsareeasytoﬁndforwhichtheupperboundofeffortin(30)
is not binding. The lower bound, however, is endogenous, and equation (31)
cannot be checked without having the solution for s in hand. We conclude
that the interiority cannot easily be guaranteed ex ante. The strategy to go
around this problem that is proposed in Jarque (2010) is the following: Solve
the problem assuming that the domain constraint can be substituted—and
hence the equivalence to the RMH can be used—and then, with a candidate
solution for s in hand, check the constraint ex post. We follow this route in
the numerical computation of an example presented next. As it turns out, it is
easy to ﬁnd parametrizations for which the ex post check on the nonnegativity
of effort is satisﬁed.
The Optimal Contract for Hidden Human
CapitalAccumulation
What do we conclude about the properties of the optimal contract in the pres-
ence of hidden human capital accumulation? Denote as  c∗ and  e∗ the solution
to problem SBaux. Whenever the sufﬁcient conditions discussed above are
satisﬁed, we have that, in the optimal contract:
1. TheoptimalconsumptionsequenceinproblemSB,c∗(P,SB),isequal
to  c∗.
2. The optimal human capital sequence in SB, s∗(P,SB), is equal to  e∗.366 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
3. The optimal effort sequence in SB, e∗(P,SB), can be recovered from
the effort solution to problem SBaux using
e∗
1(P,SB) =   e∗
1
e∗
2(P,SB) =   e∗
2 − ρ  e∗
1.
Importantly, the optimal consumption sequence has the same properties as in
thesolutiontoastandardRMHproblemwithoutpersistence. Also,theoptimal
human capital sequence has the same properties as the effort sequence in a
standard RMH problem. These properties were discussed at length in Section
3. Using these properties, we can reﬂect on the economic meaning of the ex
post check implied by equation (31).
Whenever the ex post check in (31) is satisﬁed, the optimal contract asks
theagenttoincreasehumancapitalineveryperiod. Thatis,theremaininglevel
of human capital from the previous period, after depreciation, ρs1,i sn e v e r
sufﬁcient to cover the requirement of human capital for the current period, s2i
for i = L,H. In light of the properties of effort in a standard RMH problem,
itiseasytoseethatthisconditionmaynotbesatisﬁedinsomeexamplessince
a decrease in the level of human capital from one period to the next could
be part of the optimal solution for the principal. In particular, we learned in
Section3thatinaninteriorsolutionwewilltypicallyhavee2H <e 1, sincethe
smoothing of incentives that is present in the ﬁrst period is not available in the
second, making effort in the second period relatively more expensive. Given
the results we just established for the case with persistence, this means that
we will typically have s2H <s 1 in the optimal contract with hidden human
capital accumulation. How does this lead to a violation of the ex post check
in equation (31)? For certain parameters, we may have that s2H is so much
smaller than s1 that, in fact, we have s2H <ρ s 1 + e, violating the interiority
of effort choices. That is, if it were feasible, the principal would choose to
have s2 lower than ρs1 +e. However, in the true problem with human capital
accumulation (problem SB), effort needs to stay within its domain in each
period, i.e., e2i >efor all i, which rules out the possibility of decreasing s2
below ρs1 + e. Any adjustment should be made in the ﬁrst period, when the
principal anticipates the added cost of future incentives. That is, the solution
for s1 should differ from the one that was just presented. Unfortunately,
characterizing how exactly the solution for s1 changes is not easy. Solving for
the optimal contract in this case becomes more complicated. As we argued,
the independence of second-period choices from ﬁrst-period choices breaks
down, both for the principal and for the agent. In practice, even the numerical
computation of examples is more involved, since all feasible combinations of
effortacrossthetwoperiods(andchoicescontingentonrealizationsofoutput)
need to be tested for incentive compatibility. The simple recursive structure
with w2i as a state variable is no longer valid, and the dimensionality of theA. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 367
computationalproblemissimilartothatofthestrategyproposedinFernandes
and Phelan (2000).
The next section presents an example for which the ex post check in
(31) is satisﬁed, and hence solving for the optimal contract is simple. Us-
ing the numerical solution, we discuss the implications of persistence for
consumption and effort paths by comparing the solution to that of the case
without persistence (ρ = 0).
6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE WITH UNOBSERVED EFFORT:
A COMPARISON
For cases in which the equivalence to a RMH is valid, we can ﬁnd the solution
to our problem with persistence using the usual numerical methods to solve
standard RMH problems without persistence.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the implications for effort and consumption in
the solution to an example with the parameter values listed in Table 1. The
example without persistence has ρ = 0, while the example with persistence
has ρ = 0.2. For the numerical examples we use the functional forms u(c) =
2
√
candtheprobabilityspeciﬁcationin(7). Wealsosete = 0.01ande = 0.99
in order to restrict to cases with full support.
In Figure 1, the solution for s and e in the SB problem with persistence
is plotted with a solid line. As we can see in the top panels, the level of
s1 in problem SB is always higher with persistence than without persistence
(dashed line). Since s1 = e1, a higher level of s1 with persistence reﬂects the
fact that human capital is accumulated in the ﬁrst period with the same cost
as nonpersistent effort, but it lasts (partially) until the following period.12
The solutions for the paths of optimal s in the FB model are also repre-
sented in Figure 1 (dotted and dash-dotted line respectively for the persistent
and nonpersistent case). The comparison clearly shows that human capital
accumulationmakesfrontloadingofs optimal. (Thisalsotranslatesintofront-
loading of effort as shown clearly in the bottom panels of Figure 1.) The main
difference with the solutions to the respective SB problem is the level (higher
in the FB problem). A second difference is that, even without persistence, in
the second period the requirement for s may decrease in the SB problem, for
incentive reasons, following both realizations (although the decrease may be
more pronounced after yH), and hence we have s1 >s 2i for all i.
As we can see in the bottom panels of the solution to the SB problem,
both with persistence and without, effort is higher in the initial period than in
12 The level of s2i in this example coincides with and without persistence for all i. This is
particular to this example and is violated if, for example, the level of w0 is modiﬁed. Although
human capital in the second period is equivalent to nonpersistent effort (because there are no further
periods to exploit the persistence of human capital), the optimal choice for w2i will typically be
different across the two models.368 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Contingent Paths for Human Capital and Effort in the
Optimal Contract with and without Effort Persistence, both
for the First-Best and the Second-Best Models
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Notes: s (y1): human capital contingent on history y1; e(y1): effort contingent on history
y1; P: see Table 3, ρ = 0.2; NP: see Table 3, ρ = 0.
the second. However, the frontloading of effort is much more pronounced
with persistence. This is also true when comparing the solutions for the
FB problem: While effort stays constant from one period to the next in the
case without persistence, with persistence it is frontloaded, as discussed in
Section 2.A. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 369
Figure 2 Contingent Paths for Consumption in the Optimal Contract
with and without Effort Persistence, both for the First-Best
and the Second-Best Models
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Notes: c(y1,y2): consumption contingent on history (y1,y2); P: see Table 3, ρ = 0.2;
NP: see Table 3, ρ = 0.
Consumption, depicted in Figure 2, is, in the SB case, virtually the same
with and without persistence. It simply increases when the realization is
yH and decreases when it is yL for the standard incentive provision reasons
discussed in the earlier sections. However, we can see in the FB case that
consumption is slightly lower in the case with persistence. Since the FB case370 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 3 Summary Statistics
ρ = 0.2 (FB) ρ = 0.0 (FB) ρ = 0.2 (SB) ρ = 0.0 (SB)
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is calculated numerically but without using a grid, we conclude that most
likely consumption is also slightly lower with persistence in the true solution
to the unobservable effort case.
Table3reportsthevalueofsomesimplestatisticsofthecomparisonacross
the two models presented in Figures 1 and 2. The FB model statistics are
included for reference, since they correspond to the solutions reported already
in Sections 1 and 2. All expectations in the ﬁrst period are conditional on s∗
1,
and those in the second are conditional on s∗
2i. When comparing the statistics
for the SB problem, we see that persistence implies a higher level of expected
consumption, expected utility, and a slightly higher variance of consumption
intheﬁrstperiod. Whenlookingatthesethreemomentsacrossperiodswesee
that persistence implies a steeper increase of expected consumption in time.
Again, the statistics on consumption need to be interpreted with care since
they are likely inﬂuenced by the use of a grid.
As for expected effort, we see that the level is higher with persistence
in the initial period, but it drops below the no persistence case in the second
period (a much steeper decrease than without persistence). The comparison
of the expected accumulated human capital explains this: The expected level
of s1 with persistence is much higher than the level of e1 without persistence,
but the solution for s2 with persistence is similar (in this particular example,
identical) to the solution for e2 without persistence.
7. CONCLUSION
When learning by doing is an important factor in a repeated agency rela-
tionship, solving for the optimal contract is generally very difﬁcult. In the
framework studied here, with linear disutility of effort and the productivity of
the agent being a distributed lag of past efforts, we provide an example with
a simple solution. This allows us to numerically establish some properties ofA. Jarque: Hidden Human Capital Accumulation 371
the optimal contract. On one hand, the human capital of the agent in equi-
librium and, hence, his productivity tend to be higher with learning by doing
than without. Moreover, the optimal contract offered to the employee implies
a lower productivity in the ﬁnal years of the contract. The human capital of
the agent is left to depreciate since, close to the end of the contract, the cost
of incentives of requiring a higher productivity is not justiﬁed by the beneﬁt
of future productivity. This implies that, over the contractual relationship,
effort is frontloaded and follows a steeper decreasing pattern than in the case
without learning by doing. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the properties of
wagedynamicsremainunchangedwithrespecttothoseoftheoptimalcontract
without learning by doing.
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